OS JOGOS DOS ESTADOS: RACIONALISMO vs CONSTRUTIVISMO
Palavras-chave:
Teoria dos Jogos, Construtivismo, Realismo, Institucionalismo neoliberal, NeorrealismoResumo
O presente artigo engloba uma reflexão teórica sobre os grandes debates teóricos que atravessam o campo das Relações Internacionais, a saber: o realismo, o neorrealismo, o liberalismo, o institucionalismo neoliberal e o construtivismo. Abordar-se-á a racionalidade dos jogos dos Estados, opondo o construtivismo à Teoria dos Jogos, de forma a investigar as suas principais diferenças e/ou limitações metodológicas. Não obstante a riqueza das várias teorias que dão forma ao campo das Relações Internacionais, acredita-se que os jogos que os Estados jogam são melhor explicados através do recurso à análise hermenêutica, auxiliada por uma perspetiva construtivista que visa interpretar a ação a partir de “dentro”, privilegiando a compreensão e as razões da ação dos Estados, por meio das quais eles definem a sua identidade e podem ou não alterar os seus interesses como resultado da interação com o mundo social.
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