RULE OF LAW E PERFORMANCE DEMOCRÁTICA EM PERSPECTIVA
Palavras-chave:
Checks and Balances, Judicialização da política, Performance democráticaResumo
O debate sobre constitucionalismo vem ocorrendo por meio da compreensão sobre em quais condições as escolhas institucionais delimitam o design constitucional adotado por um determinado país. A instituição da Constituição nacional ocupa papel central nesta discussão, tendo em vista que esta é a lei feita para durar, funcionando como mecanismo de checks and balances. O presente artigo aborda esta temática por meio de um review teórico da literatura, promovendo um debate entre a judicialização da política e a teoria democrática contemporânea.
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