A ação moral frente ao pessimismo na filosofia de Arthur Schopenhauer

Abstract

This article presents the pessimistic world‘s view of the philosopher Arthur Schopenhauer, as a result from his observation about what is always reaffirmed in the existence of beings, especially in the human species: pain and suffering. It shows that, despite his pessimistic view, Schopenhauer develops an idea of morality based on what he considered being the most genuine feeling, responsible for reducing the suffering caused by life's misfortunes: compassion. Thus, the aim of this paper is to argue that moral action, always based on compassion, can be an attenuating factor for this world in which shows all kinds of misfortune, because it is a way of suspending the imperious will, always active and never satiable. To achieve this purpose, a bibliographic survey was made not only of the works of the philosopher himself, but also of his commentators, as well as texts related to the present scope. In Schopenhauer's case, the works The world as will and as representation and On the foundation of morals are indispensable to treat the proposed question stand out. After analyzing these works, compassion is confirmed not only as a feeling capable of suspending the will, diminishing, and even suppressing an illusory distance between beings, but also identifying in it the starting point for something even greater, which may lead to a suppression of will: the ascesis.