Contributions of Charles Sanders Peirce to scientific realism
Keywords:
Abduction, Fallibilism, Perception, Realism, Scientific RealismAbstract
The present work aims to stablish a relationship between contemporary scientific realism and the realism defended in the work of Charles Sanders Peirce. We seek to highlight points defended by the American philosopher that contribute to the contemporary debate about scientific realism. By delving into his metaphysical postulates, we seek to establish Peirce's understanding of the concept of reality and gather from it the epistemological conditions that guide the intricacies of scientific investigation. We recognize at least three principles of Peirce's work capable of contributing to discussions about scientific realism: i) the elaboration of hypotheses, outlined in abductive inference; ii) the acceptance of uncertainty in representations, linked to fallibilism; and iii) the possibility of making considerations about elements that cannot be immediately perceived, configured in the theory of perception.
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