REALISMO CIENTÍFICO, VERDADE INDEXADA E INDUÇÃO PESSIMISTA

Authors

  • Tiago de Carvalho Ponti Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro, Brasil

Keywords:

Realismo Científico. Indução pessimista. Verdade. Verdade indexada. Submundos.

Abstract

The debate between realism and anti-realism, within the scope of scientific knowledge, revolves around the existence of non-observable entities postulated by theories and the truth (or approximate truth) of these theoretical claims. Taking into consideration the challenge posed by the pessimistic induction argument against scientific realism, I aim, in this article, to develop a qualified scientific realism based on a revision of the truth concept and the introduction of the stricter concept of "truth indexed to subworlds." This novel approach to truth allows us to classify theories from the past as either false simpliciter or true in subworlds, thereby thwarting the pessimistic induction.

Author Biography

Tiago de Carvalho Ponti, Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro, Brasil

Possui graduação em Administração (2003) e em Filosofia (2007) pela Universidade Estadual de Londrina (UEL). Também pela UEL, especializou-se em História e Filosofia da Ciência (2005). Em 2016, tornou-se Mestre em Filosofia (Lógica e Metafísica) e em 2021 obteve o grau de Doutor em Filosofia (Lógica e Metafísica), ambos pela UFRJ (PPGLM). Atua, principalmente, em metafísica, em especial, no campo da: persistência, natureza do tempo, modalidade, objetos abstratos e mereologia.

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Published

2023-12-24

How to Cite

de Carvalho Ponti, T. (2023). REALISMO CIENTÍFICO, VERDADE INDEXADA E INDUÇÃO PESSIMISTA. REVISTA INSTANTE, 5(2), 458–475. Retrieved from https://revista.uepb.edu.br/revistainstante/article/view/2919

Issue

Vol. 5 No. 2 (2023): DOSSIÊ: FILOSOFIA DA CIÊNCIA E REALISMO CIENTÍFICO

Section

Artigos

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Copyright (c) 2023 REVISTA INSTANTE