A BOTTOM-UP INDUCTIVIST DEFENSE OF EPISTEMOLOGICAL SCIENTIFIC REALISM
Keywords:
Scientific Realism. Inference to the best explanation. Abduction. InductivismAbstract
Neste artigo, apresento uma defesa do realismo científico epistemológico segundo a qual temos mais razões para acreditar na realidade das entidades detectadas e na verdade aproximada das proposições sobre elas. Minha defesa é diferente das estratégias explicativas usuais. Em vez de desenvolver uma argumentação explicativa top-down, que consiste em avaliar os méritos de várias explicações de fenômenos e, em seguida, decretar que a melhor explicação provavelmente será verdadeira, oferecerei um argumento bottom-up que parte de observações para ascender às causas que as produzem. Embora essas causas não sejam diretamente observadas, temos boas razões para acreditar em sua existência se forem detectadas, ou seja, se estiverem causalmente ligadas a observações diretas. Essa abordagem bottom-up tem a vantagem de não ser vulnerável às objeções levantadas contra a inferência da melhor explicação. Para ilustrar esse ponto, argumentarei que o famoso argumento de Le Verrier para a existência de Netuno é convincente precisamente porque implementa essa estratégia bottom-up.
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