LOGICAL REALISM AND SOME CONSIDERATIONS ON THE CURRENT DEBATE IN PHILOSOPHY OF LOGIC

Authors

  • Ederson Safra Melo Universidade Federal do Maranhão, Brasil
  • César Frederico dos Santos Universidade Federal do Maranhão, Brasil

Keywords:

Logical Realism. Logical Anti-Exceptionalism. Logical Conventionalism. Metaphysics of Logic.

Abstract

Realism in logic asserts that logical theories should reflect an autonomous reality independent of the mind, language, inferential practices, and any other human conventions. Traditionally, logical reality has been conceived as a Platonic realm of abstract entities, but more recent versions suggest that natural reality itself somehow contains the elements that make logical laws true. This article provides a brief critical introduction to logical realism and highlights how the realist conception is prevalent in the current debate in the philosophy of logic, particularly within the anti-exceptionalism stream on logic. The main challenge of realism lies in the indeterminacy of the nature of logical reality and, consequently, the set of data that logical theories should take into account. As an alternative to logical realism, we present logical conventionalism, which assumes that logical laws do not correspond to any reality but are instead conventions established by logicians. However, conventionalism also faces its own set of problems. The article concludes by acknowledging the difficulties surrounding the metaphysics of logic.

Author Biographies

Ederson Safra Melo, Universidade Federal do Maranhão, Brasil

Professor Adjunto do Departamento de Filosofia da Universidade Federal do Maranhão (UFMA). Fez graduação em Filosofia pela Universidade Estadual de Londrina (2009); mestrado e doutorado na área de Lógica e Epistemologia pelo Programa de Pós-Graduação em Filosofia da Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina. Durante o doutorado foi pesquisador visitante na Brown University, EUA. Atualmente, é líder do grupo de pesquisa em Filosofia da Lógica e da Linguagem (GFILL, CNPq) e subcoordenador do Núcleo de Estudos em Lógica e Filosofia Analítica (NELF) da UFMA. É professor permanente do Programa de Pós-Graduação em Filosofia da UFMA. Ensina e pesquisa nas áreas de lógica, filosofia da lógica, filosofia da linguagem e epistemologia.

César Frederico dos Santos , Universidade Federal do Maranhão, Brasil

Professor Adjunto do Departamento de Filosofia da Universidade Federal do Maranhão (UFMA), doutor em Filosofia pela Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, e mestre e bacharel em Filosofia pela Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina. Atualmente, é coordenador do Núcleo de Estudos em Lógica e Filosofia Analítica (NELF) da UFMA e subcoordenador do Programa de Pós-Graduação em Filosofia da UFMA. Sua pesquisa trata de temas em filosofia da lógica e filosofia da matemática com uma abordagem empiricamente informada.

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Published

2023-12-24

How to Cite

Safra Melo, E., & Frederico dos Santos , C. (2023). LOGICAL REALISM AND SOME CONSIDERATIONS ON THE CURRENT DEBATE IN PHILOSOPHY OF LOGIC. REVISTA INSTANTE, 5(3), 339–368. Retrieved from https://revista.uepb.edu.br/revistainstante/article/view/3002

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Vol. 5 No. 3 (2023): DOSSIÊ: FILOSOFIA DA CIÊNCIA E REALISMO CIENTÍFICO

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