REFRAMING FREGE’S LEGACY ABOUT PRAGMATISM, INFERENTIALISM, AND COGNITIVE SCIENCE:

NOTES OF NEW OPTIONS FOR PHENOMENOLOGICAL CONSENSUS

Authors

Keywords:

Frege. Pragmatism. Inferentialism. Cognitive science. Phenomenology.

Abstract

The primary objective of this exploratory article is to examine the way in which Frege's theory is framed within the framework of inferentialism, as developed by Robert Brandom’s expressivism, and the underlying pragmatic consequences of this shift. Subsequently, we aim to address one pressing challenge currently faced by the field of philosophy of mind and cognitive science: how can we reconcile the pragmatic aspects of successful assertion and inferential coherence with a theoretical and scientific representation of mental contents? This article states the failure of the Fregean tradition to uphold Frege's original anti-psychological tendencies and advocates for the development of a theory of mental content that is compatible with the notion of inference present in Frege's work. The last objective of the article, addressed in a last chapter, is to explore the challenges for a new phenomenological consensus.

Author Biography

Lucas Ribeiro Vollet, Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina, Brasil

I received my doctorate in philosophy in 2016 from the Federal University of Santa Catarina-(Brazil), with a work on Kant (Kant and Conjectural Empiricism), advised by Professor Dr. Werner Euler and with a period abroad with Professor Dr. Paul Guyer (Brown University). My advisor during the Master's and undergraduate studies was Darlei Dallagnol.

My publications have appeared in Husserl Studies, Studia Kantiana, Aurora, Cognitio (PUC-SP), Kant-e-prints, Instante, Kalagatos, among others.

The angles of reflection in my articles mix the study of continental and analytical philosophers.
Supervisors: Prof.Dr. Werner Euler, Prof. Dr. Darlei Dagnoll, and Prof. Dr. Paul Guyer

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Published

2024-06-26

How to Cite

Vollet, L. R. (2024). REFRAMING FREGE’S LEGACY ABOUT PRAGMATISM, INFERENTIALISM, AND COGNITIVE SCIENCE:: NOTES OF NEW OPTIONS FOR PHENOMENOLOGICAL CONSENSUS. REVISTA INSTANTE, 6(1), 1–25. Retrieved from https://revista.uepb.edu.br/revistainstante/article/view/3172

Issue

Vol. 6 No. 1 (2024): Revista Instante

Section

Artigos