Non-conceptualism and perception
some epistemological consequences
Keywords:
Perceptual content, Non-conceptualism, Conceptualism, Scenario-content, ExternalismAbstract
In this article, we intend to analyze the epistemological consequences of the non-conceptualist approach to perceptual content. First, we will mention the main arguments in favor of the non-conceptualist thesis: the conceptual learning argument; the argument for perception in infants and non-human animals; and the richness of experience argument. Next, the scenario-content model is proposed as the representational content of perception. The next step is to discuss the conceptualist objections, in particular the myth of the given. Finally, we will hypothesize that the best way to understand the epistemic role of perception, in a non-conceptualist model, is by distinguishing internal and external forms of epistemic warrant, which we call justification and entitlement, correspondingly. One of the main upshots of non-conceptualism is to reject excessively intellectualist positions of epistemic entitlement.
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