O CONCEITO DE MENTIRA SEGUNDO KANT

Authors

  • Karine Cristine de Souza Barboza Universidade Federal do Paraná, Brasil https://orcid.org/0009-0007-0406-9792
  • Joel Thiago Klein Universidade Federal do Paraná, Brasil

Keywords:

Lie, Utterance implication, Duty of truthfulness, Intentionality, Immorality

Abstract

The present article aims to examine the definition of lying in Kant’s work, in order to develop the declaration condition, the addressee condition, the intentionality condition and the untruthfulness condition. To this end, a distinction is made between mere expressions and declarations, as well as between untruthfulness, falsehood, and falsification. Regarding the declaration, it is emphasized that the liar does not ignore or misunderstand the utterance implication but actively uses this implication made by the listener. Although this implication is not necessary for the success of the lie, Kant establishes a direct relationship between the utterance implication and the declaration of honesty, such that the speaker must observe the duty of truthfulness. This declaration of honesty can not only be stated directly but is also explicitly required in both ethical and legal contexts. Furthermore, the centrality of the intentionality condition in Kant's definition of lying is defended, in such a way that only through intention is it possible to differentiate a lie from error and from non-deceptive untruths, such as fiction and irony. Thus, lying is defined as a form of simulation characterized by the dissimulation of the speaker’s real intention. Additionally, it is argued that lying involves two levels of untruthfulness: namely, regarding thought and regarding intention. The first concerns the lie about the truth value of the assertion, while the second concerns the lie about the truth value of the declared belief.

Author Biographies

Karine Cristine de Souza Barboza, Universidade Federal do Paraná, Brasil

Bachelor of Philosophy from the Federal University of Paraná (2020). Master's in Philosophy from the Federal University of Paraná (2024). PhD candidate in joint supervision in Philosophy at the Federal University of Paraná and the University of Vechta (Germany). Research interests include moral philosophy, political philosophy, and epistemology in Kant’s philosophy.

Joel Thiago Klein, Universidade Federal do Paraná, Brasil

Graduated and earned a Master’s degree in Philosophy from the Federal University of Santa Maria (2008) and a PhD in Philosophy from the Federal University of Santa Catarina (2012), with a doctoral research stay at Humboldt University of Berlin. Currently serves as Professor of Modern Philosophy, Ethics, and Political Philosophy at the Federal University of Paraná (UFPR), teaching at both undergraduate and graduate levels. Additionally, he is a permanent faculty member in the Graduate Program in Philosophy at the Federal University of Santa Catarina (UFSC). Completed a postdoctoral fellowship at Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München with CAPES/Alexander von Humboldt funding for experienced researchers. Previously a visiting professor at Goethe University Frankfurt. Editor of Studia Kantiana (journal of the Brazilian Kant Society since August 2015, Qualis A2). Member of the Board of Directors of the Brazilian Kant Society (terms 2014–2018, 2018–2022, 2023–2026). Sustaining member of the Kant Working Group (GT Kant) of ANPOF. Associate member of the Philosophy Center at the University of Lisbon. Member of the Kant-Gesellschaft. Research Productivity Fellow (CNPq) since 2016. Former CAPES and DAAD fellow.

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Published

2024-12-26

How to Cite

Barboza, K. C. de S., & Klein, J. T. (2024). O CONCEITO DE MENTIRA SEGUNDO KANT. REVISTA INSTANTE, 6(3), 142–174. Retrieved from https://revista.uepb.edu.br/revistainstante/article/view/4156

Issue

Vol. 6 No. 3 (2024): DOSSIÊ: KANT E A FILOSOFIA PRÁTICA

Section

Artigos